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Introduction and summary
In late 1997, Southeast Asia was rocked by banking
and currency crises. While dramatic in scope and in-
tensity, this episode was only the latest in a series
of twin crises. Other prominent examples include
Argentina (1980), Chile (1981), Uruguay (1981),
Finland (1991), Sweden (1991), and Mexico (1994).
In this article, we review and interpret the recent
Korean and Thai experiences, focusing on the pivotal
role of unfunded contingent government liabilities.
We concentrate on the Korean and Thai cases both
because their crises were severe and because neither
country appeared to be a likely candidate for a currency
crisis, at least not from the perspective of standard
economic models.
In addition to being of independent interest, the
lessons learned from the Korean and Thai episodes
should be useful in predicting and averting future twin
crises.1 In a nutshell, these lessons are as follows.
First, twin crises are likely to erupt in countries whose
governments have large prospective deficits stemming
from guarantees to failing financial sectors. Such
guarantees typically insure creditorsboth domestic
and foreignagainst realizing large losses when finan-
cial institutions that they have lent money to become
insolvent or go broke. Second, past deficits are, at
best, a noisy indicator of how large a governments
prospective deficits are. Accurately measuring the
latter requires a careful analysis of the nature of a gov-
ernments guarantees and the probability that those
guarantees will be called upon. It may never be pos-
sible to predict precisely when a twin crisis will occur.
But more accurate measures of prospective deficits
are likely to be helpful in predicting where twin crises
will occur. Finally, to avoid currency crises, govern-
ments must have credible plans to finance contingent
liabilities with credible, explicit fiscal reforms. Such
reforms include concrete measures to cut government
expenditures or raise taxes.
In the body of the article, we provide the empirical
background for our analysis. We begin by motivating
empirically the importance of past banking crises as
a source of government liabilities. We then briefly re-
view the salient features of the recent crises in Korea
and Thailand. These can be summarized as follows.
1. Both currency crises were difficult to predict on
the basis of standard economic indicators, such
as inflation rates, monetary growth rates, or past
government deficits.
2. Neither banking crisis was difficult to anticipate,
certainly not if one used publicly available infor-
mation about the market value of financial firms
in Korea and Thailand.
3. When the crises came, they came with a vengeance.
The Korean won and Thai baht rapidly depreciated
by over 50 percent and 80 percent, respectively,
vis-à-vis the dollar before partially rebounding in
value. In addition to the large social costs associ-
ated with severe recessions, the crises saddled the
Korean and Thai governments with very large lia-
bilities. These arose both from their implicit guar-
antees and the need to restructure their respective
banking systems. As we discuss below, these costs
are now estimated to exceed 25 percent of Koreas
and Thailands gross domestic product (GDP).
4. After the crises, the rates of inflation and money
growth rose in both countries, though not by nearly
as much as the rates of depreciation of the won and
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the baht. The rise in the price of tradable goods was
much larger than the rise in the price of nontrad-
able goods.
Later, we provide an explanation of the way in
which prospective deficits could have caused the cur-
rency crises. The basic idea is that the Korean and Thai
financial sectors were in trouble prior to the currency
crises and investors knew this. Given the Korean and
Thai governments implicit guarantees to their bank-
ing sectors, market participants revised upwards their
estimates of future government deficits. Given the
difficulty of raising tax revenues or lowering govern-
ment expenditures in the wake of a severe banking
crisis, private agents expected that future deficits would
be financed, at least in part, by higher seigniorage
revenues. This led to expectations of higher future in-
flation rates and a reduction in the demand for domes-
tic currency. The resulting drain on official reserves
of foreign currency triggered the currency crises.
Finally, because many financial institutions did not
hedge the currency mismatch in their assets and lia-
bilities, the currency crises exacerbated the initial
banking crises and raised the associated fiscal costs.
We articulate these ideas using a simplified version
of the model in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(1999). In versions of the model roughly calibrated
to Korean data, a speculative attack occurs after the
information about higher future deficits arrives but
before the new monetary policy is implemented. So
the model is consistent with the idea that the fixed
exchange rate regimes in Korea and Thailand collapsed
after agents understood that the banks were failing,
but before governments actually started to monetize
their deficits. Thus the model can account for facts 1
and 2 discussed above: The banking crises were pre-
dictable but standard indicators of bad government
policyhigh deficits, high inflation rates, and rapid
money growthwere not observed prior to the crises.
While successful on a number of important dimen-
sions, the benchmark model suffers from several
shortcomings. First, it implies a larger rate of inflation
than actually occurred after the crises. Second, the
model predicts that the domestic Consumer Price Index
(CPI) moves one to one with the exchange rate. So it
inconsistent with the fact that the rise in measured
inflation was smaller than the rate of depreciation in
the won and baht. In addition, since the benchmark
model assumes that all goods are tradable, it cannot
address the post crises differential rates of inflation
in traded and nontraded good prices. We briefly dis-
cuss ongoing research that shows how the benchmark
model can be modified to overcome these shortcom-
ings.2 From the perspective of this article, the key
point is that the modifications do not alter the models
message about the connection between prospective
deficits and currency crises.
Finally, we turn to the issue of which countries
might be at risk for the kind of twin crises experienced
by Korea and Thailand. Here we reproduce and dis-
cuss Standard and Poors recent estimates of govern-
ments contingent liabilities to financial sectors. These
estimates reveal that a governments exposure to future
contingent liabilities is not well estimated by conven-
tional debt measures. Since future deficits can be just
as important as past deficits in triggering currency
crises, policymakers who focus only on conventional
debt measures do so at their peril. When the storm
comes, they will be taken by surprise. Our research
suggests that they need not be, provided that they
spend more resources on measuring the extent of their
contingent liabilities.
Basic facts
Our analysis of recent events in Southeast Asia
leans heavily on the notion that the Thai and Korean
governments faced serious fiscal problems because
of implicit, unbudgeted guarantees to their banking
sectors. In this section we accomplish two tasks. First,
we provide some evidence on the fiscal implications
of banking crises in a variety of countries. Second,
we briefly review the twin crises and their aftermath
in Korea and Thailand.
Fiscal costs of past banking crises
Table 1 summarizes estimates of the fiscal costs
of banking crises, as a percentage of GDP, taken from
the studies summarized by Frydl (1999). Table 2
contains estimates of the costs of the recent banking
crises in Southeast Asia, taken from Standard and
Poors Sovereign Ratings Service.3
Comparing tables 1 and 2 we see that, while large,
the magnitude of the bailouts in Southeast Asia was
by no means unprecedented (see, for example, table
1 on the costs of the Argentinian, Chilean, and
Uruguayan banking crises in the 1980s). No doubt
there is substantial uncertainty about the precise fiscal
cost of any given banking crisis. Still, two things are
clear. First, banking crises occur with depressing reg-
ularity. And second, when they happen, they impose
large fiscal costs on governments.
Brief review of the twin crises in Korea
 and Thailand
Here, we briefly review the prelude and aftermath
of the twin currencybanking crises in Thailand and
Korea. In addition to providing general background
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for our analysis, we substantiate the claims summarized
as facts 1 through 4 in the introduction.
The currency crises
Figures 1 and 2 display the exchange rates of the
baht and the won, where the exchange rate is defined
as the price of a dollar in units of local currency.4 It is
evident that Thailand and Korea experienced severe
currency crises in the latter part of 1997. The crises
were severe in the sense that both currencies underwent
very large depreciations in a short period of time: The
TABLE 1
 Fiscal cost of banking crises, studies surveyed by Frydl (1999)
Caprio and Klingebiela Lindgren et al.b Dziobek & Pazarbasiogluc
(July 1996) (mid-1996) (December 1997)
Group Country Period Costd Period Costd Year Costd
Africa Benin 1988–90 17 1988
Cote d’Ivoire 1988–91 25 1988–90 1991 13
Ghana 1982–89 6 1983–89 3 1989 6
Guinea 1985 3 1980–85
Mauritania 1984–93 15 1991–93 1993 15
Senegal 1988–91 17 1983–88
Tanzania 1987 10 1988– 6.5 1992 14
Zambia 1995 1.4 1994 3 1995 3
Asia Bangladesh Late 1980s– 1980s 4.5
Indonesia 1994 1.8 1992– 2 1994 2
Malaysia 1985–88 4.7 1985–88 4.7
Philippines 1981–87 3 1981–87 13.2 1984 4
Sri Lanka 1989–93 5 early 1990s
Thailand 1983–87 1.5 1983–87
Latin America Argentina 1980–82 55.3 1980–82 4
Argentina 1995 1995 1994 0.3
Bolivia 1994– 4.2
Brazil 1994–95 7.5 1994–
Chile 1981–83 41.2 1981–87 29 1983 33
Colombia 1982–87 5 1982–85
Mexico 1995 13.5 1994– 6.5 1994 13.5
Peru 1983–90 1991 0.4
Uruguay 1981–84 31.2
Venezuela 1994–95 18 1994– 17 1994 17
Mideast and Israel 1977–83 30 1983–84
North Africa Kuwait 1980s Mid-1980s 1992 45
Turkey 1982–85 2.5 1982
Turkey 1994 1
Transition Bulgaria 1990s 14 1991–
economies Czech Rep. 1991– 12
Estonia 1992 1.4 1992–95 1.8
Hungary 1991–95 10 1987– 9 1993 12.2
Kazakhstan 1991–95 4.5 1995
Poland 1990s $1.7bil 1991– 1993 5.7
Slovenia 1990s $1.3bil 1992–94
Advanced Finland 1991–93 8 1991–94 8.4 1991 9.9
OECD France 1994–95 $10bil 1991–95 0.6
Japan 1990s $100bil 1992 1995
Norway 1967–89 4 1987–93 3.3
Spain 1977–85 16.8 1977–85 5.6 1980 15
Sweden 1991 6.4 1990–93 4 1991 4.3
United States 1984–91 3.2 1980–92 2.4
aDates indicate the period of the crisis episode. Dash indicates that the crisis was ongoing at the date of publication.
bDates indicate the period of the banking sector difficulties. Dash indicates that the difficulties were ongoing at
the date of publication.
cDate indicates year of onset of restructuring action.
dPercent of GDP, unless stated otherwise.
Note: OECD is Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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value of the baht relative to the dollar declined by
over 50 percent between June 1997 and January
1998; and the value of the won relative to the dollar
declined by over 48 percent between October 1997
and January 1998.5
The bankingfinancial sector crises
Both Korea and Thailand experienced severe
bankingfinancial sector crises that began before their
currency crises. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999)
report that pre-crisis nonperforming loan rates were
19 percent in Thailand and 16 percent in Korea, or
roughly 30 percent and 22 percent of GDP, respec-
tively. That being said, the currency crises certainly
exacerbated the financial crises.6 According to J.P.
Morgan (1998), as of June 1998, the rate of nonper-
forming loans in both Korea and Thailand had risen
to roughly 30 percent. By June 1999, the cost of re-
capitalizing and restructuring the banking system in
Thailand reached 35 percent of GDP (see table 2). As
of December 1999, the corresponding cost in Korea
had reached 24 percent of GDP.
Was the public aware of the banking crises be-
fore the currency crises? In our view the answer is
yes. First, proprietary information from some bank
rating services and investment banks had raised doubts
about the health of the local banks. Second, the mar-
ket value of the banking and financial sectors in
Thailand and Korea declined precipitously before the
currency crisis hit. Table 3, extracted from Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999), reports indexes of
the stock market value of publicly traded banks and
financial firms in Thailand and Korea. In addition, we
report the analog value of the commercial and manu-
facturing sector in Thailand and Korea, respectively.7
The column labeled Pre-crisis peak pertains to the
date of the peak value of the banking sector in the two
countries. Three features of table 3 are worth noting.
First, in both countries, the value of the banking and
finance sectors fell by large amounts before the cur-
rency crises. For example, in the period between the
pre-crisis banking peak and the day immediately pri-
or to the currency crisis, the value of the Thai and
Korean finance sectors fell by 92 percent and 52 per-
cent, respectively. Second, in the case of Thailand,
the value of the financial sector fell by a large amount
relative to the decline in the commerce sector. In the
case of Korea, the manufacturing sector index actually
rose up to the day before the crisis. So the decline in
the value of the financial sectors did not
simply reflect a decline in the overall
stock market. Markets seemed particular-
ly concerned about the financial sector.
Both Thailand and Korea had low
inflation rates prior to their currency cri-
ses. Over the two previous years, the CPI
in Thailand and Korea rose at annual
rates of 5 percent and 4.6 percent, respec-
tively,8 giving no hint of the currency cri-
ses to come.
Figures 1 and 2 display measures of
the CPI, the Producer Price Index (PPI),
and indexes of export and import prices
in the periods immediately before and
after the currency crises. In both countries
overall consumer and producer price in-
flation was moderate in the aftermath of
the devaluation. For example, in Thailand,
the CPI rose roughly 11 percent between
June 1997 and June 1998, and only rose
TABLE 2
Costs of restructuring and recapitalizing
banking system
Percent Date of
of GDP estimate
Indonesia 65 November 1999
Korea 24 December 1999
Malaysia 22 December 1999
Thailand 35 June 1999
Note: Dates refer to date of issue of source
country reports.
Source: Standard and Poor’s Sovereign Ratings
Service, various country reports.
FIGURE 1
Prices in Thailand
index, June 1997=100
Baht/U.S. dollar
Notes: IUV is import unit value; EUV is export unit value; PPI is
Producer Price Index; and CPI is Consumer Price Index.
Source: “Data bank” at www.bot.or.th.
IUV
EUV PPI
CPI
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a further 1 percent by March 2000. In Korea, the CPI
rose 7.2 percent between October 1997 and October
1998. Also notice that import and export prices
moved much more in response to movements in the
exchange rate (see figures 1 and 2) than either the
CPI or the PPI.
So, the behavior of inflation after the crises can
be summarized as follows. First, in both Korea and
Thailand, there was a moderate rise in inflation, mea-
sured using either the CPI or the PPI. But the rise in
overall inflation was much less than the rate of depreci-
ation in the respective exchange rates. Second, trad-
able goods prices rose substantially, with the rate of
increase being similar in magnitude to the rate of
depreciation of the won and the baht. An important
issue we return to later is how to account
for these two facts.
Fiscal deficits and debt
Prior to their crises, Thailand and
Korea had been running fiscal surpluses
and had fairly modest debt to GDP ratios.9
The overall fiscal position of the Thai
government, inclusive of interest payments,
was positive, with a surplus of close to 3
percent of GDP in 1994 and 1995 and
0.7 percent of GDP in 1996. The amount
of government debt held by domestic res-
idents was very small before 1997, while
public sector external debt was roughly
10 percent of GDP before 1997. In Korea,
the governments overall fiscal position
and primary balance (government expen-
ditures minus tax revenues) were always
in surplus, though close to zero, in 1994
96. The governments domestic debt at
the end of 1996 was just 7.6 percent of
GDP, while consolidated public sector external debt
was just 6.1 percent of GDP.
Since the crises, both countries have been run-
ning fiscal deficits and have accumulated substantial
amounts of new debt. By the end of 1998, the Thai
governments domestic debt had jumped to almost 10
percent of GDP, while external public sector debt
rose to almost 25 percent of GDP. In Korea, the gov-
ernments domestic debt rose to 19.1 percent of GDP
by the end of 1998, while public sector external debt
rose to 11.4 percent of GDP.
We conclude that 1) traditional measures of gov-
ernment deficits or debt gave no indication of the
currency crises to come in Korea and Thailand, and
2) the debt situations of the governments in both
countries appeared radically different
before and after the twin crises.
Monetary policy since the crises
In the immediate aftermath of their
crises, Thailand and Korea both followed
tight monetary policies. Neither country
allowed its monetary base to expand rap-
idly. Indeed, by the end of 1998 both
countries had roughly the same amount
of base money as they had at the onset of
their crises.
The monetary authorities did extend
enormous credit lines to their banking
systems. From the onset of the crises to
the end of 1997, Thai central bank credit
to deposit money banks rose 761 percent.
The corresponding figure for Korea was
FIGURE 2
Prices in Korea
index, October 1997=100
Won/U.S. dollar
Notes: EPI is Export Price Index; IPI is Import Price Index; PPI is
Producer Price Index; and CPI is Consumer Price Index.
Source: “Statistics” at www.bok.or.kr and Datastream.
IPIPPI
CPI
TABLE 3
Stock market indexes in Thailand and Korea
Pre-crisis peak Day before crisis
Thailand 1/4/94 6/30/97 7/31/98 5/2/00
Banking 221.6 100 23.4 44.0
Finance 1,286.7 100 36.0 60.2
Commerce 318.4 100 59.6 76.3
Korea 8/3/91 10/28/97 7/31/98 5/2/00
Banking 214.2 100 28.6 27.2
Finance 206.3 100 29.4 32.2
Manufacturing 79.8 100 47.6 111.0
Note: Indexes reflect values in local currencies.
Source: Bloomberg and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999).
EPI
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281 percent. The period of tight money concluded
by the end of 1998. In 1999 both countries signifi-
cantly raised their money supplies, with the base rising
more than 50 percent in Thailand and about 37 percent
in Korea.
Based on this evidence we conclude that the Thai
and Korean governments eventually moved to par-
tially monetize their debt, but there was a substantial
lag until they did so.
Real activity
The costs of the twin crises in terms of aggregate
economic activity were very real, with both countries
suffering large recessions.10 In Thailand, the recession
began in early 1997. By 1997:Q4 real GDP was 4.4
percent lower than it had been in 1996:Q4. The first
half of 1998 saw real GDP fall a further 15 percent.
In the following six months the economy grew at a
fast pace, but by 1999:Q4 real GDP was still 5.8 per-
cent below its level in 1996:Q4. In Korea, real GDP
(seasonally adjusted) grew about 4 percent in the first
three quarters of 1997, and then fell about 9 percent
in the next three quarters through mid-1998. Since
then growth has rebounded. Real GDP in 1999:Q4
was 7.1 percent above its level in 1997:Q3.
With this brief and selective review as back-
ground, we turn to our interpretation of the crises in
Korea and Thailand.
Prospective deficits and currency crises:
A benchmark model
In the introduction we argue that the Korean and
Thai currency crises were caused by large prospective
deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to
failing banking systems. Here we formalize this argu-
ment using a simplified version of the model in
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999). Our objec-
tives are twofold. First, we explain the basic mecha-
nisms at work in the more complicated model. Second,
we show that the simple model can account for a key
fact about the East Asian currency crises: They erupted
after the banking crises began but before high deficits
and excessive money growth were observed.
The key ingredients in the benchmark model are
as follows. A small open economy with no barriers to
trade is initially operating under a fixed exchange rate
regime. Output is given exogenously and is constant.11
At some point in time agents receive information that
future deficits will be larger than they originally be-
lieved. Agents assume that the government will pay
for the increase in the deficit entirely via seigniorage
revenues. It is understood that the government will
do this via a change in monetary policy that begins
sometime in the future. Agents demand for domestic
real balances is decreasing in the domestic interest
rate and increasing in real output. The government
faces the usual intertemporal budget constraint. As is
standard in the literature, we assume that the govern-
ment follows a threshold rule according to which the
fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned in the first
period that net government debt reaches some exoge-
nous upper bound. Thereafter, the economy operates
under a floating exchange rate regime.
Turning to specifics, we assume that the model
economy is populated by three sets of agents: domestic
agents, a government, and foreigners. There is a single
consumption good and no barriers to trade, so that
purchasing power parity holds:
1) P
t
 = S
t
 P
t
*.
Here, P
t
 and P
t
* denote the domestic and foreign
price level respectively, while S
t
 denotes the exchange
rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency). According to equation 1, the real cost of
buying the good is the same in the domestic economy
as abroad. For convenience, we assume that P
t
* = 1 so
that foreign inflation is zero.
For simplicity, we assume that domestic agents
per period real income, Y, is constant over time. Private
agents are competitive and can borrow and lend domes-
tic currency at the nominal interest rate, R
t
. The total
demand for domestic money is given by:12
( ) ( )2) log log ORJ   = + − η  t tt
M Y R
P
Here, M
t
 denotes the beginning of period t domes-
tic money supply, and θ is a positive constant. Accord-
ing to equation 2, the demand for money depends
positively on Y, and negatively on the opportunity
cost of holding money: the nominal interest rate, R
t
.
The parameter η represents the semi-elasticity of
money demand with respect to the interest rate.
In the absence of uncertainty, the nominal interest
rate is equal to the real rate of interest, r
t
, plus the
rate of inflation, pi
t
:
3) R
t
 = r
t
 + pi
t
.
By assumption, the home country is small rela-
tive to international capital markets so that r
t
 is exog-
enous from that countrys perspective. So, absent
capital market restrictions, r
t
 is the same as the risk-
free real rate of interest in international capital mar-
kets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this
rate is constant so that r
t
 = r for all t.
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The government of the home country purchases
goods, g
t
, makes transfer payments, v
t
, levies lump sum
taxes, τ
t
, and can borrow at the real interest rate r.
Again, for simplicity, we assume that g
t
, v
t
, and τ
t
 are
constant over time and equal to g, v, and τ, respectively.
A sustainable fixed exchange rate regime
Suppose that the home country is initially in a
fixed exchange rate regime so that S
t
 = S. Equation 1
implies that the domestic rate of inflation, pi
t
, is equal
to the foreign rate of inflation, pi
t
*, which we assume
equals zero. It follows from equation 3 that the nomi-
nal rate of interest is equal to the constant real inter-
est rate: R
t
 = r for all t ≥ 0. Under a fixed exchange
rate, the domestic money supply is endogenous: It
must equal the level of money demanded, given the
exchange rate, S,
4) M = SθY exp(ηr).
If the government tried to print more money than
M, private agents would simply trade it, at the fixed
exchange rate, for foreign reserves. Consequently, as
long as the country is in a fixed exchange rate regime,
the government cannot generate seigniorage revenues.13
Under what circumstances is the fixed exchange
rate regime sustainable? In our model the answer to
this question reduces to whether the money supply
can be constant over time. Whether this is possible
depends critically on whether the government can
abstain from raising seigniorage revenues. This in turn
depends on the governments fiscal policy.
To see the nature of the required restrictions on
fiscal policy, note that with money constant for all t,
the governments flow budget constraint is:
5) .= + + − τ&t tb rb g v
Here, b
t
 represents the governments stock of
real debt, net of any assets, and tb& denotes the deriva-
tive of b
t
 with respect to time. According to equation
5, the change in b
t
 (more precisely, )&tb is equal to the
interest cost of servicing government debt, rb
t
, plus
the primary deficit, g + v  t. Imposing the condition
that the present value of b
t
 goes to zero in the infinite
future, we obtain the governments intertemporal
budget constraint,14
6) rb
0 
= τ  g  v.
According to equation 6, for the fixed exchange
rate to be sustainable, the government surplus must be
just large enough to cover the interest cost of servicing
its initial debt. When this is the case, the government
does not print money. It simply stands ready to trade
domestic money for foreign money at the exchange
rate S. Since the demand for money is constant, so
too is the supply. So, as long as equation 6 holds, the
economy will be in a sustainable fixed exchange rate
equilibrium with S
t
 = S for all t.
A currency crisis
To see how a banking crisis can generate a cur-
rency crisis, suppose that equation 6 initially holds.
Then, at time t = 0, private agents learn that there has
been an increase in the present value of the deficit
equal to φ, say because of an increase in future trans-
fer payments associated with bank bailouts. Also,
suppose private agents correctly believe that the gov-
ernment will not undertake a fiscal reform to pay for
the bank bailouts; that is, they will not raise taxes or
lower real government purchases or transfers. While
we could allow for a partial fiscal reform, for simplicity
we assume that g, v, and τ remain constant at their
initial pre-crisis values.15 It follows that the only way
that the government can satisfy its intertemporal bud-
get constraint is to embark on a monetary policy that
generates a present value of seigniorage revenues
equal to φ:16
*
( ) .rt rit i
t
it i
M M
PV Seigniorage e dt e
P P
∞
− −
∆7) φ = = + ∑∫ &
Here, t* denotes the time when the economy
moves to a floating exchange rate regime, tM& is the
derivative of the money supply with respect to time,
and 
*
rtt
t
t
M
e dt
P
∞
−∫ &  represents the present value of the
resources that the government raises by printing
money. The term rii
i
i
M
e
P
−
∆∑  represents changes in
seigniorage revenue following discrete jumps in the
money supply. These terms must be included because
the money supply may jump discontinuously when
the fixed exchange rate regime collapses or because
of government monetary policy (see Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 1999 and 2000a).
Could the fixed exchange rate be sustained once
new information about higher deficits arrives? Suppose,
for a moment, that it could. Then the money supply
would never change and the government could not
collect any seigniorage revenues. So all the terms on
the right-hand side of equation 7 would equal zero.
But then the governments budget constraint would
not hold. This contradicts the assumption that the
fixed exchange rate regime is sustainable. We conclude
that the government must at some point move to a
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floating exchange rate system. The precise time at
which this occurs depends on 1) the governments
rule for abandoning fixed exchange rates, and 2) the
governments new monetary policy.
With respect to 1, we follow a standard assump-
tion in the literature that the government abandons
the fixed exchange rate regime according to a thresh-
old rule on government debt.17 Specifically, we assume
that the government floats the currency in the first
time instance, t*, when its net debt hits some finite
upper bound. As it turns out, this is equivalent to
abandoning the fixed exchange rate whenever the
amount of domestic money sold by private agents in
exchange for foreign reserves exceeds χ percent of
the initial money supply (see the appendix). In addi-
tion to being a good description of what happens in
actual crises, the threshold rule assumption can be in-
terpreted as a short-run borrowing constraint on the
government: It limits how much reserves the govern-
ment can borrow to defend the fixed exchange rate.18
With respect to 2, we assume that at some point
in the future, time T, the government will engineer a
discrete increase in the money supply of γ percent
relative to M, the level of the money supply during
the fixed exchange rate regime. In addition it will set
the growth rate of the money supply from then on
equal to µ. The parameters µ and γ must be such that
the governments intertemporal budget constraint,
equation 7, holds. This specification decouples the
endogenous timing of the speculative attack from the
time at which the government undertakes its new
monetary policy. Because of this we can allow for
a delay between the end of the fixed exchange rate
regime and when the government moves to monetize
the debt.
Before turning to the quantitative properties of
our model, we note that the rate of inflation, the
money supply, and the level of government debt can
be discontinuous in our perfect foresight economy.
However, the exchange rate path must be continuous.
To see why, suppose to the contrary that there was a
discontinuous increase in the exchange rate at time
t*. Since purchasing power parity implies that P
t
 = S
t
,
inflation would be infinity at t*. This would imply
that the nominal interest rate would also be infinity
at t* so that money demand would be equal to zero.
Private agents would want to sell all of the domestic
money supply to the government. But the government
is only willing to buy χ percent of it. Hence, this can-
not be an equilibrium.
Equilibrium of the model: Numerical examples
In the appendix, we show how to solve for the
equilibrium of the model economy. Here, we describe
the characteristics of the equilibrium for a calibrated
version of the model.
n We normalize real income, Y, and the initial
exchange rate, S, to 1.
n We set the parameter φ to 0.25, a conservative
estimate of the cost of Koreas banking crisis
relative to its GDP.
n We set the semi-elasticity of money demand with
respect to the interest rate, η, equal to 0.5. This is
consistent with the range of estimates of money
demand elasticities in developing countries pro-
vided by Easterly, Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1985). Since Korea is not included in that study,
we discuss the sensitivity of our results to this
parameter.
n We assume that the risk-free real interest rate, r, is
equal to 1 percent and set the constant, θ, in mon-
ey demand so that the model is consistent with the
ratio of real balances to GDP in Korea before the
crisis. See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(1999, 2000a). For η = 0.05, this implies a value
of θ approximately equal to 0.06.
n Based on the evidence in Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (1999), we set the threshold parameter,
χ, to 0.03.
n For simplicity we normalize the governments
initial stock of debt, b
0
, to zero.
n The monetary base in Korea was roughly the same
at the end of 1998 as at the beginning of the crisis.
However, by the end of 1999, the base had risen by
over 30 percent. Given these facts, the key question
in deciding on a value for T is: When did agents be-
come convinced that the government would have to
bail the banks out? This is a difficult issue to resolve.
Here we report results for T = 3. While our qualita-
tive results are robust to this choice, we think further
research on this question is important. At the end
of this section we briefly consider one interesting
implication of setting T = 1.
n We set the parameter γ to 0.1. Finally, we solve
for the value of µ that satisfies the governments
intertemporal budget constraint (µ= 0.043).
Figure 3 displays the equilibrium path of the
benchmark model. Two features are worth noting.
First, the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime
takes place at time t* = 2.19, after the new informa-
tion about the deficit arrives (t = 0) but before the new
monetary policy is implemented (T = 3). Second,
inflation begins to rise at t*, before the change in mon-
etary policy. So, consistent with the classic results in
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Sargent and Wallace (1981), future monetary policy
affects current inflation. Because of purchasing power
parity and the absence of nontradable goods, the rate
of inflation is the same as the rate of depreciation of
the exchange rate.
Next, consider the behavior of the money supply
and net government assets (b
t
). As we argued earlier,
the level of the money supply is constant as long as
the fixed exchange rate regime lasts ( t < t*). It then
drops by χ percent as agents trade domestic money
for foreign reserves. Since the governments foreign
reserves fall at t*, the governments net assets fall by a
corresponding amount. Thereafter, the money supply
is constant until the government begins its new mon-
etary policy. At time T there is a policy-induced jump
in the money supply to M
T
 after which it grows at
the constant rate µ. Since the government engineers
increases in the money supply by retiring debt or pur-
chasing foreign reserves, net government assets jump
at time T and then increase at a rate that depends on
the timing of the government bank bailouts.
Why doesnt the fixed exchange rate regime
collapse at time 0?
The reader may wonder why the fixed exchange
rate doesnt collapse at t = 0 when agents receive the
new information about future deficits. To understand
why the collapse generally occurs after t = 0, two
things must be kept in mind. First, as long as the gov-
ernment has access to foreign reserves and is willing
to use them, it can fix the price of its currency. It does
so by exchanging domestic money for foreign reserves
at the fixed price S. In our model the government is
willing to do this until the level of domestic money
falls by χ percent. Put differently, a fixed exchange
rate regime is a price fixing scheme that will endure
as long as the government has the ability and the
willingness to exchange domestic currency for dollars.
If the government was not willing to endure any in-
creases in its debt, that is, it was not willing to buy
back any of the domestic money supply at S
t
 = S, then
the exchange rate regime would collapse at t = 0. Given
the governments willingness to buy back no more than
χ percent of the money supply, the key determinant of
when the fixed exchange rate regime collapses is
when money demand falls by χ. Second, as a result
of the discrete increase in money supply at time T,
inflation is monotonically increasing between t* and
T (see Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2000a).
This reflects the fact that in standard Cagan money
demand models, the price level at time t is a function
of discounted current and future money supplies. An
important feature of this function is that the further
out in time is the increase in the money supply, the
less impact it has on the initial price level.19 In general,
inflation is too low at time zero to produce a fall in
money demand large enough to trigger the
governments threshold rule.20
The preceding arguments suggest
that the higher the interest rate elasticity
of money, the sooner the fixed exchange
rate collapses. Consistent with this intu-
ition, we find that when η = 1, t* = 1.24.
When η = 0.1, t* rises to 2.85. Notice that
1) even at the high value of η, the fixed
exchange regime still collapses after t = 0,
and 2) even at the low value of η, the
fixed exchange rate regime still collapses
before T.
Consistent with the previous intu-
ition, the appendix shows that t* satisfies:
* ln .t T
 χ8)    = + η  χ + γ + µη 
So, other things equal, the longer the
government delays implementing its new
monetary policy (the larger is T) and the
more willing the government is to accu-
mulate debt (the higher is χ), the later the
FIGURE 3
Benchmark model
percent
CPI and exchange rate
percent
CPI inflation and tradables inflation
percent
Money supply
percent
Government assets
time time
time time
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fixed exchange rate regime will collapse. In addition,
the higher is the interest rate elasticity of money de-
mand (the larger is η) and the more money the gov-
ernment prints in the future (the higher are γ and µ),
the sooner the speculative attack will occur.21
Some caution is required in interpreting these re-
sults because we are not free to vary the parameters
on the right-hand side of equation 8 independently of
each other. For example, equation 8 indicates that t*
is increasing in the threshold rule parameter, χ, taking
the parameters that control monetary policy (γ, µ,
and T) as given. But these parameters must be adjust-
ed whenever a different χ is considered because the
governments intertemporal budget constraint must
hold. This issue is addressed by Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (1999), who show numerically that the
qualitative conclusions emerging from equation 8
remain intact even after the appropriate adjustments
are made. This is also the case for the simple model
considered here. For example, if we set T to 1, then
with one exception the equilibrium path of the model
is qualitatively similar to the one depicted in figure
3. The exception is that t* falls to 0.18 or a bit over
two months. Interestingly, this is the time lag between
when forward premia on bahtdollar exchange rates
began to rise significantly and the Thai currency
crises occurred (see Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo, 1999).
 Strengths and weaknesses of the benchmark model
On the positive side, the benchmark model does
what it was intended to do: It illustrates the fact that
new information about prospective deficits can cause
the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime after
information about the deficit arrives but before the
government starts its new monetary policy. In addi-
tion, the model reproduces the fact that CPI inflation
initially surges in the wake of the exchange rate col-
lapse and then stabilizes at a lower level.22
On the negative side, 1) the model clearly over-
states the actual rate of inflation in Korea after the
crises, particularly in the period between t* and T
(see figure 2), and 2) the model does not account for
the different response in tradable and nontradable
goods prices. In assessing these shortcomings, it is
important to note that the models implications for
inflation depend heavily on two simplifying assump-
tions. First, we assume that the only additional source
of revenues available to the government in the after-
math of the currency crisis is seigniorage. Second,
there is only one good in the model economy, and
purchasing power parity holds. It follows from equation
1 that an x percent rate of devaluation is necessarily
associated with an x percent rise in the price level.
This is clearly counterfactual. In the next section, we
discuss work in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(1999, 2000a) that examines the implications of
relaxing these assumptions.23
Perturbations to the benchmark model
Allowing for nonindexed government liabilities
In the benchmark model, we assume that all of
the governments liabilities are perfectly indexed, so
that their real value is unaffected by a devaluation. In
reality, governments have liabilities denominated in
units of local currency that are not indexed to the rate
of inflation. These liabilities are of two types: a) domes-
tic bonds issued before information about a banking
crisis becomes known, and b) obligations to programs
like Social Security or commitments to purchase labor
services and other nontraded goods whose value is
preset in units of the domestic currency. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999, 2000a) discuss the
impact of these types of liabilities on the implications
of the benchmark model.
The basic point is that inflation reduces the real
value of nonindexed liabilities and acts like a partial
fiscal reform, effectively providing the government
with a source of revenue other than seigniorage. But
to gain access to these revenue sources, there must be
inflation. In our model, inflation is possible only in a
flexible exchange rate regime. So the presence of
nonindexed liabilities does not allow the government
to escape a currency crisis. However, it does allow
the government to print less money than it would
have to in the absence of nonindexed liabilities. This
in turn implies that the modified model does a much
better job of accounting for the observed post-crises
rates of inflation in Korea and Thailand.24
Allowing for nontraded goods
The benchmark model assumes that all goods
are tradable and that purchasing power parity holds.
Because of this, it is inconsistent with two key facts
about the crises in Korea and Thailand: 1) the rate
of CPI inflation was much lower than the rate of
depreciation in the won and the baht, and 2) the price
of tradable goods rose much more than the price of
nontradable goods after the fixed exchange rate
regimes collapsed.
In modifying the benchmark model we are
forced to confront the question What underlies the
empirical failure of purchasing power parity? In its
simplest form this condition asserts that the real cost
of buying the CPI basket of goods is the same in all
countries. In reality some goods simply arent traded,
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so there is no reason for their prices to be the same in
different countries. Consequently, the real price of
the CPI basket will not be equalized across countries.
Purchasing power parity may also fail because trans-
portation and distribution costs prevent tradable good
prices from equalizing across countries.
Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2000) argue on em-
pirical grounds that total distribution costs (including
wholesale and retail services, marketing, and so on)
are often more significant than the costs of transport-
ing goods across countries. They study the role played
by the distribution sector in shaping the behavior of
real exchange rates during exchange rate based stabi-
lizations. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a)
show how to use Burstein, Neves, and Rebelos anal-
ysis to break the benchmark models counterfactually
tight link between the inflation rate and the rate of
depreciation of the exchange rate. The key result is
that once some stickiness in nontraded goods prices
is allowed for, the modified model does a reasonable
job of accounting quantitatively for the different
post-crisis responses of traded and nontraded goods
prices in Korea and Thailand.
The basic features of the modified model can
be described as follows. As in Burstein, Neves, and
Rebelo (2000), assume that it takes δ units of non-
traded goods to distribute one unit of the traded good
to the domestic retail sector. Let P
t
NT and P
t
T denote
the time t price of a nontraded good and the time t
price of a traded good before distribution. Suppose
for simplicity that the distribution and retail sectors
of the economy are perfectly competitive. Then the
retail price of a traded good is equal to P
t
T + δP
t
NT.
The CPI is defined to be the geometric average of the
price of the nontraded good and the retail price of the
traded good:
( ) ( )1 ,−ωω9)   = + δT NT NTt t t tP P P P
where ω is a number between 0 and 1.
The demand for real balances is given by equation
2, where P
t
 is given by equation 9. By assumption,
purchasing power parity holds for the price of traded
goods, exclusive of distribution services. With P
t
*
equal to 1, this implies P
t
T = S. Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2000a) also allow for nominal rigidities
in the price of nontradable goods. With these changes,
the modified model is qualitatively consistent with
facts 1 and 2 above.
Much work remains to be done in assessing the
empirical plausibility of the modified versions of the
benchmark model discussed in this section. Still, the
results in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999,
2000a) suggest that these types of models are capable
of explaining the large departures from purchasing
power parity and relatively low inflation rates ob-
served in the wake of currency crises. Just as important,
bringing the models into closer conformity with these
aspects of the data does not alter our basic message:
Unfunded prospective deficits can be an important
source of currency crises.
Prospective deficits: Other countries
Throughout this article, we examine the role of
unfunded prospective deficits as a potential cause of
currency crises. We are not alone in this view. At the
end of 1997, Standard and Poors began to report esti-
mates of contingent government liabilities stemming
from implicit guarantees to financial sectors. Next,
we discuss these estimates and their relationship to
conventional debt measures.
Table 4 reproduces Standard and Poors contingent
government liability estimates as of January 2000. To
arrive at these estimates, Standard and Poors first es-
timates the lower and upper percentages of financial
intermediaries loans that are at risk under various
scenarios it deems to be likely. These are reported in
the column labeled Group. These bounds are mul-
tiplied by a measure of the size of the financial system
relative to GDP to generate estimates of lower and
upper bounds for government contingent liabilities.
These are reported in table 4 in the columns labeled
Lower bound and Upper bound. Note that these
estimates can be large either because the financial
system has substantial exposure to nonperforming
loans or because a countrys banking system is large
relative to its GDP. The final column in table 4 sum-
marizes the size of existing government debt relative
to GDP.
Two features of table 4 are worth noting. First,
there is enormous variation in the size of government
liabilities across different countries. The performance
of some countries on the low end like Denmark and
Canada reflects very solid financial institutions, while
the performance of countries like Bulgaria reflects the
small size of their financial sector. At the high end,
the performance of countries like Japan, Panama,
Malaysia, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Korea,
and Thailand reflects financial sectors that are both
large and risky.
Second, there is not a tight link between existing
government debt and contingent liabilities. For exam-
ple, Belgiums government has a very high debt to
GDP ratio of 111 percent, but low contingent liabilities
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(the upper bound is 12 percent of GDP).
In contrast, Malaysias government has a
moderate debt to GDP ratio of 37 percent
but high contingent liabilities (the upper
bound is roughly 60 percent of GDP).
Some countries, like Japan, have both a
high debt to GDP ratio (roughly 130 per-
cent) and large contingent liabilities (the
upper bound is approximately 60 percent
of GDP).
We conclude by emphasizing, as
does Standard and Poors, that the esti-
mates reported in table 4 embed a host of
assumptions and must be interpreted with
caution. Still, there is clearly enormous
variation in the exposure of different
governments to future contingent liabili-
ties, and that exposure is not well estimated
by conventional debt measures.
Conclusion
This article reviews and interprets
the recent currency crises in Korea and
Thailand. We argue that a prime cause of
the crises were large, implicit govern-
ment guarantees to financial sectors. To
articulate this view, we present and ana-
lyze versions of the model in Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999). While
successful on a number of dimensions,
the model clearly leaves out various fac-
tors that were important parts of the sto-
ry. For example, we assume that agents
discovered at a particular point that the
banks were failing and that the government
was going to bail them out. The truth is
obviously more complicated. Market
participantslike generalsmust oper-
ate in the fog of battle. Without a doubt,
the fog was thick in Korea and Thailand.
The process by which agents cut through
the fog and converged on their views
about banks future prospects influenced
the exact timing of the crises. Modeling
that process would almost surely overturn
the stark implication of our benchmark
model that the timing of the currency
crises was perfectly predictable.25 How-
ever, it would not overturn the basic mes-
sage: Large unfunded prospective deficits
can be a prime source of currency crises.
TABLE 4
Lower Upper Government
Group Country bound bound debt
5% – 15% Australia 4 13 31
Belgium 4 12 111
Canada 4 13 86
Denmark 3 8 56
France 4 12 61
Germany 6 17 61
Luxembourg 5 16 4
Netherlands 10 29 67
Sweden 2 7 68
Switzerland 9 26 54
United Kingdom 6 19 47
United States 7 21 57
10% – 20% Austria 9 18 63
Chile 6 13 30
Finland 5 10 45
Hong Kong 16 32 12
Ireland 11 21 52
Italy 6 12 66
New Zealand 11 22 36
Norway 8 16 31
Portugal 11 22 57
Singapore 12 24 86
South Africa 8 16 50
Spain 10 21 64
Taiwan 16 32 36
15% – 30% Argentina 3 7 49
Columbia 6 12 36
Estonia 4 8 13
Hungary 3 6 59
Israel 13 25 110
Japan 29 59 133
Panama 17 33 76
Philippines 8 15 67
Poland 4 8 42
Slovenia 5 10 33
Uruguay 6 12 36
25% – 40% Bolivia 15 25 90
Brazil 9 14 68
Croatia 10 16 29
Cyprus 26 42 60
Greece 8 13 104
Korea 45 72 66
Kuwait 17 28 57
Lebanon 20 33 123
Malaysia 37 59 37
Morocco 12 19 98
Oman 11 17 32
Peru 6 10 32
Saudi Arabia 16 25 NA
United Arab Emirates 15 24 NA
35% – 70% Bulgaria 0 3 82
China 40 79 17
Czech Rep. 23 45 17
Egypt 25 50 106
India 8 16 70
Indonesia 9 19 101
Kazakhstan 3 6 21
Latvia 5 10 16
Lithuania 5 10 19
Mexico 6 13 48
Pakistan 7 14 83
Romania 6 12 30
Russia 4 8 145
Slovakia 20 41 36
Thailand 51 101 31
Tunisia 23 45 79
Turkey 8 16 55
Venezuela 4 8 29
Note: NA indicates not available.
Standard and Poors contingent liability estimates,
January 2000,  percent of GDP
57Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIX
Solving for the equilibrium of the
benchmark model
Here, we show how to solve for the equilibrium path
of the benchmark model and determine the time of
the speculative attack. Recall that the demand for
domestic money is given by:
log( ) log(  ORJ  OQ  t t tM Y P RΑ1) = + + −
Using the fact that = + = +
&
t
t t
t
P
R r r
P
 and solving
for ln(P
t
), we obtain
( ) /
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 ORJ 
1 ln .
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i t
it
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e M di
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− −
Α2) = − − +
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Equation A1 implies that for all t < t*,
log( ) log( ) log( ) log(  S M Y rΑ3) = − − +
At the time of the speculative attack, t*, ln S
t*
 =
log S, so that equation A1 implies,
A4) ln S
t*
 = log (M)  log (Y)  log (θ) + 0r.
However, purchasing power parity and equation A2
imply that
*
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Equations A4 and A5 and continuity of the price lev-
el and S
t
 imply
( *) /
*
1log( ) ln .i t itM e M di
∞
− −Α6) = ∫
The governments flow budget constraint is
given by:
if I
LI ,
Α 7) ∆ = − ∆ ∈
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t t
t t t t t
b m t
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where t t t t tm m M P+ = &&  represents seigniorage
revenues. As in Drazen and Helpman (1987), the
households budget constraint (equation A7) takes
into account the possibility of discrete changes in M
t
and b
t
 at a finite set of points in time, I. These discrete
jumps occur at the point in time when the exchange
rate regime collapses, t*, and the point in time T,
when the government begins to implement its new
monetary policy.
The flow budget constraint, together with the
condition lim 0,−→∞ =
rt
t te b implies the following in-
tertemporal budget constraint for the government:
0 0
(  rt rit t t i
i I
b e g v m m dt e mτ
∞
− −
∈
Α8) = − − + + + ∆∑∫ &
According to this condition, the present value of fu-
ture surpluses, including the value of seigniorage
revenues, must equal the value of the governments
net initial debt. Given our assumption that govern-
ment purchases, taxes, and transfers are constant for
all t, after receiving the news about the deficit, the
government budget constraint implies:
0
(  rt rit t t i
i
m m e dt m e
∞
− −Α9) φ = + + ∆∑∫ &
Recall that we assume that the government adopts
a threshold rule for when it abandons the fixed ex-
change rate regime. One way to formulate this rule is
as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999): The
government abandons the fixed exchange rate when net
debt is equal to Ψ percent of GDP. Since we assume
that Y = 1 and b
0
 is equal to zero, at t*, b
t*
 satisfies
*
( *)
.t
M Mb
S
−
= Ψ =
It follows that we can reparameterize the threshold
rule as one in which the government abandons the
fixed exchange rate when the money supply falls by
χ percent. From the previous expression, it follows
that the money supply at time t* satisfies
A10) M* = Meχ,
where eχ is equal to (1  Ψ S/M).
At time T the government increases the money
supply by γ  percent instantaneously and then lets the
money supply grow at the rate µ. Consequently,
A11) M
t
 = Meγ + µ (tT), t ≥ T.
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Equations A10 and A11 imply that we can write
equation A6 as,
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1log( ) ln( )
1 (ln 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∫
∫
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Evaluating the different integrals and solving for
t* we obtain:
0
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Using the fact that 1) between t* and T,
t t tm m+ =&  2) Rt = r + pit = r + µ for all t ≥ T, and
3) ,tRtm Ye
−η
= θ  along with equations A10 and A11,
we can rewrite the government budget constraint
(equation A9) as:
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In order to proceed, we must solve for P
T
. Equa-
tions A2 and A11 imply that
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Substituting equations A3, A13, and A17 into A14,
we obtain
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where t* is given by equation A13. Note that given
values of φ, θ, 0, r, χ,γ, and T, equation A18 is one
equation in one unknown: µ.
Finally, for t* < t < T, P
t
 can be computed as
follows:
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NOTES
1See Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999) for an empirical analysis of
twin crises.
2We refer the reader to Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a)
for a detailed analysis of the modified model.
3Given space constraints, we refer the reader to the papers cited
in table 2 for the methodology used to generate these estimates.
Basically, the numbers reflect authors estimates of the aggregate
net worth of protected insolvent institutions.
4Values of the Thai and Korean currencies were obtained from the
IMF International Financial Statistics.
5Notice also that there is an overshooting pattern apparent in the
exchange rate data, in the sense that each currency appreciated
from its value in January 1998 until the end of our sample period,
March 2000. Taking this into account, by March 2000, the baht
and won had depreciated by roughly 32 percent and 18 percent of
their respective pre-crisis values. In this article, we do not formally
address possible causes of the overshooting pattern. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a) argue that a version of the
benchmark model in which output first declines and then recovers
after the crises can qualitatively account for the observed over-
shooting pattern of exchange rates.
6If banks have open exposure to foreign currency risk, a currency
devaluation will lead to a decline in the real value of banks assets,
reduce their net worth, and result in an increase in bank failures.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000b) discuss how govern-
ment guarantees to banks foreign creditors led banks to not hedge
the currency mismatch in their assets and liabilities, leaving them
exposed to precisely this kind of currency risk.
7All stock market data were obtained from Bloomberg. The mne-
monics for Thailand are SETBANK, SETFIN, and SETCOMM,
respectively. For Korea the mnemonics are KOSPBANK,
KOSPFIN, and KOSPMAN. These indexes reflect values in local
currencies.
8Statistics on prices in Thailand were obtained from the Data
bank at the Bank of Thailand website, www.bot.or.th/. Korean
price data were obtained from the Statistics section of the Bank
of Koreas website, www.bok.or.kr/ and from Datastream.
9The data on which this discussion is based are taken from the
following sources. Statistics on fiscal indicators for Thailand
were obtained from the Central Bank of Thailand website Data
bank and from IMF (2000b). For Korea, the data were taken
from IMF (2000a).
10Statistics on GDP in Thailand were obtained from the Bank of
Thailand Data bank website. Korean GDP data were obtained
from the Bank of Koreas Statistics website.
11This last assumption is clearly counterfactual. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a) modify the model to allow for
a decline in output after a currency crisis, followed by a recovery.
The basic message about the link between prospective deficits
and currency crises remains unaffected by this modification.
12Specifications of money demand like equation 2 are often referred
to as Cagan money demand functions.
13If there were growth in either the foreign price level or domestic
real income, the government would collect some seigniorage rev-
enue in a fixed exchange rate regime. However, this would not
affect our basic argument. The present value of such seigniorage
revenues would be pledged to help cover the present value of the
deficit that was anticipated in the initial fixed exchange rate regime.
14Technically, this requirement is given by the condition
lim 0.rtt te b
−
→∞ =
15Our basic result would not be affected by a fiscal reform as long
as the present value of the change in the primary surplus induced
by the reform was less than φ.
16This result is formally proved in the appendix.
17See, for example, Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984),
and Lahiri and VØgh (1999).
18Drazen and Helpman (1987), as well as others, have proposed a
different rule for the governments behavior: Fix future monetary
policy and allow the central bank to borrow as much as possible
provided the present value budget constraint of the government is
not violated. This rule ends up being equivalent to a threshold
rule. See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999).
19In our model, the price level at time t is given by:
1 ( ) /ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) .∞− − − η= η − θ − + η ∫ i tt itP r Y e M di
20To see why the speculative attack must occur before time T,
suppose to the contrary that the attack actually occurred at time T.
Since the government raises the money supply discretely at time
T, inflation and the nominal interest rate would be infinity at T.
But then money demand would be zero and the money market
could not clear.
21It can be shown that whenever equation 8 implies a negative
value for t*, the exchange rate regime collapses at t = 0. This will
happen for: 1) sufficiently high interest elasticities of money de-
mand; 2) low values of χ, or 3) large values of γ and µ required
to finance the prospective deficit. In this case the exchange rate
will jump at time zero. This does not contradict our argument that
the exchange rate path must be continuous. This is because the
discontinuity in the exchange rate at time zero coincides with the
arrival of the unanticipated news about prospective deficits.
22For example, in the model, the inflation rate during the year
from October 1997 to October 1998 is 11.25 percent. The inflation
rate in the year after is roughly 4 percent. The corresponding
rates of CPI inflation in the Korean data are roughly 7 percent
and 1 percent, respectively.
23Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a) also discuss the im-
plications of relaxing the assumption that output is constant after
the speculative attack.
24For example, steady-state inflation in the modified model drops
by a factor of three relative to its value in the benchmark model.
25Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000c) analyze a model in
which government guarantees to banks foreign creditors imply
that a currency crisis will almost surely occur. But the time at
which it occurs is stochastic.
60 Economic Perspectives
NOTES
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio
Rebelo, 2000a, How do governments pay for twin
crises?, Northwestern University, manuscript.
                    , 2000b, Hedging and financial fragility
in fixed exchange rate regimes, European Economic
Review, forthcoming.
                    , 2000c, On the fundamentals of self
fulfilling currency crises, Northwestern University,
manuscript.
                    , 1999, Prospective deficits and the
Asian currency crises, Northwestern University,
mimeo.
Burstein, Ariel, Joao Neves, and Sergio Rebelo,
2000, Distribution costs and real exchange rate
dynamics during exchange-rate-based stabilizations,
Northwestern University, mimeo.
Caprio, Jr., G., and D. Klingebiel, 1996, Bank in-
solvencies: Cross country experience, World Bank,
working paper, No. 1620.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel
Roubini, 1999, What caused the Asian currency
and financial crisis?, Japan and the World Economy,
Vol. 11, pp. 305373.
Drazen, Allan, and Elhanan Helpman, 1987,
Stabilization with exchange rate management, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, pp. 835855.
Dziobek, C., and C. Pazarbasioglu, 1997, Lessons
from systematic bank restructuring: A survey of 24
countries, International Monetary Fund, working
paper, No. 97/161.
Easterly, William, Paolo Mauro, Klaus Schmidt-
Hebbel, 1995, Money demand and seigniorage-
maximizing inflation, Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking, Vol. 27, pp. 583603.
Flood, Robert, and Peter Garber, 1984, Collapsing
exchange rate regimes: Some linear examples, Jour-
nal of International Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 113.
Frydl, Edward, 1999, The length and cost of bank-
ing crises, International Monetary Fund, working
paper, No. WP/99/30.
International Monetary Fund, 2000a, Republic
of Korea: Statistical appendix, staff country report,
No. 00/10, February.
                    , 2000b, Thailand: Statistical appendix,
staff country report, No. 00/20, February.
J. P. Morgan, 1998, Asian financial markets, third
quarter 1998, report, July 17.
Kaminsky, Graciela, and Carmen Reinhart, 1999,
The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance-
of-payments problems, American Economic Review,
Vol. 89, pp. 473500.
Krugman, Paul, 1979, A model of balance of pay-
ments crises, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
Vol. 11, pp. 311325.
Lahiri, Amartya, and Carlos VØgh, 1999, Delaying
the inevitable: Optimal interest rate policy and BOP
crises, University of California, Los Angeles, mimeo.
Lindgren, C-J., G. Garcia, and M. I. Saal, 1996,
Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, Wash-
ington: International Monetary Fund.
Polackova, H., 1999, Contingent government liabili-
ties: A hidden fiscal risk, Finance and Development,
A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, Vol. 36, No. 1.
Sargent, Thomas, and Neil Wallace, 1981, Some
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, Quarterly Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Vol. 5, pp. 117.
